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NOTES
FEDERAL PREEMPTION AND STATE
JURISDICTION OVER LABOR-MANAGEMENT
RELATIONS PROBLEMS UNDER SECTION
14(c) OF THE LMRA
I. BACKGROUND
With the passage of the National Labor Relations Act of 1935,1
Congress showed its intention to place the federal government in a
primary position to oversee labor-management relations problems,
which, prior to 1935, had been primarily looked after by the several
states.2  The several states had, however, seemed to fail m the
task of overseeing labor relations problems, and, indeed, m some
cases, seemed unwilling to undertake it.8 Thus, Congress was in-
duced to create a national administrative agency to foster mdus-
trial peace, to protect interstate commerce, and to promote the
growth of organized labor.4  Congress took this action pursuant to
its commerce clause5 power, and the validity of its action was
upheld by the Supreme Court in 1937 6
The national agency, although given authority to the fullest ex-
tent of Congress' commerce power,7 has never, since its inception,
1. 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 151-168 (1965), 49 Stat 449 (1935) , hereinafter referred to as the
NLRA or the Wagner Act.
2. Meltzer, The Supreme Court, Congress, and State Jurisdictton over Labor Relations,
59 COLUM. L. Rzv. 6, 8 (1959), Smith, The Taft-Hartley Act and State Jurisdiction over
Labor Relations, 46 MICH. L. REv. 593, 606 (1948).
3. Aaron, The Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, 73 HARv. L.
REv. 1086, 1095 (Part II, 1960), 105 Cong. Rec. 17875 (Sept. 3, 1959), remarks of Senator
Morse.
4. The findings and policies of Congress are set out in 29 U.S.C.A. § 141 (1965).
5. U. S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 3.
6. National Labor Relations Board v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U. S. 1 (1937),
National Labor Relations Board v. Fruehauf Trailer Co., 301 U.S. 49 (1937), National
Labor Relations Board v. Friedman-Harry Marks Clothing Co., 301 U.S. 58 (1937).
7. Guss v. Utah Labor Relations Board, 353 U. S. 1, 3 (1957), National Labor Re-
lations Board v. Fainblatt, 306 U. S. 601 (1939).
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been able to exercise it.8 This has been due primarily to budget-
ary shortages. 9 Because of the National Labor Relations Board's
failure to completely exercise its authority, and because of the fact
that so comprehensive a labor code as the Wagner Act was, must
necessarily be ambiguous, problems in the division of federal-state
jurisdiction began to arise. e
From 1935, with the passage of the Wagner Act, to 1947 with the
enactment of the Taft-Hartley Amendments," the federal labor laws
dealth mainly with the protection and promotion of unionism, in the
face of unfair practices by employers. 12 Decisions regarding the
dividing line between federal-state jurisdiction - preemption deci-
sions - by the Supreme Court from 1937 to 1947 (and from thence
onward) have necessarily been on primarily an ad hoc basis be-
cause of the changing facts of the several cases, and because of a
lack of clear showing of congressional intent.'8 During the decade,
1937 to 1947, the National Labor Relations Board was not extremely
interested in unfair labor practices by labor unions, as they were
not expressly covered by the NLRA. 4 Thus, state jurisdictions
over infractions of various types by labor unions was not too ser-
iously challenged in the period 1937 to 1947 15
With the enactment of the Labor Management Relations
Act in 1947, the scope of federal intervention into the field
of labor relations was greatly expanded. Along with that
expansion came a greater degree of uncertainty as to the
extent of pre-emption which the new Act intended to create.
The search for the legislative intent began, but it was
fruitless. As with the Wagner Act, the Courts found them-
selves without guidance and were forced into the responsi-
bility of clothing the skeleton of the statute in order to give
definite limits to its scope.' 6
In the period 1947 to 1957, the Supreme Court decided that a
umon which engaged in work stoppages without striking could be
8. Guss v. Utah Labor Relations Board, 353 U. S. 1, 3 (1957), Note, 62 YALE L. J.
116 (1952).
9. Note, 71 HAev. L. RPv. 527, 536 (1958).
10. Aaron, supra note 3 at p. 1089.
11. Labor-Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 141-188 (1965), 61 Stat. 186
(1947) hereinafter referred to as the LMRA or Taft-Hartley.
12. Section 8(b), 29 U.S.C.A. 158(b), dealing with unfair labor practices by labor
organizations was added by P.L. 101 (1947), 61 Stat. 140 (1947).
13. Roumell and Schlesinger, The Preemption Dilemma in Iabor Relations, 18 U. DET.
L. J. 17, 22 (Part 1, 1954), Petro, Participation by the States in the Enforcement and
Development of National Labor Policy, N. Y. U. FiFTH ANNUAL CONF. ON LAB. 1, 23 (1952).
14. Supra note 12.
15. Meltzer, The Supreme Court, Congress, and State Jurisdiction over Labor Relations,
59 COLUM. L. Rv. 6, 8 (1959), Long, Boundaries of State-Federal Jurisdiction in Labor-
Management Relations under the new Labor Law -- a State View, N.Y.U. THiRTEENTH
ANNUAL CONF. ON LAB. 75, 77 (1960).
16. Roumell and Schlesinger, supra note 13 at p. 27, Labor Decisions of the
Supreme Court at the October Term, 1957, 44 VA. L. Rzv. 1057, 1059 (1958), International
Association of Machinists v. Gonzales. 856 U.S. 617. 619 (1958).
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ordered to desist by a state labor board;17 that a state labor
board could invalidate a contractual maintenance of membership
agreement which did not comply with state law in its inception; ' 8
that a state court could vindicate the personal rights of ousted
union members; 19 and that a state court could enjoin union picket-
Ing which threatened, intimidated, or provoked violence.
20
In addition, the Court had previously determined that a state
labor board could issue a cease and desist order to halt mass
picketing, on the grounds that such action was within the police
power of the state.21
On the other side of the coin, the Court determined in Weber
v Anheuser-Busch, Inc.22 that termination of unfair labor practice
charges was primarily in the NLRB and that state jurisdiction to
enjoin peaceful strikes had been preempted by the LMRA. 23
The Court also decided that a state could not regulate a par-
ticular industry (public utilities) so as to prohibit peaceful strikes. 24
In 1957 the Court rendered a series of three decisions 25 which
seem to nearly completely put an end to state jurisdiction over
labor relations problems, except in those settings where the state's
police power could be invoked.
The Guss case stated that state labor relations boards had no
jurisdiction over matters which were protected by Section 72s or
prohibited by Section 827 of the Labor Management Relations Act.
The Fatrlawn Meats case stated that state court action could
not be permitted within the area of commerce which was within
the competence of the national board, even though such state
action might be consistent with the policy of the national act.
17. International Union, United Auto Workers of America, A. F. of L., Local 232 v.
Wisconsin Employment Relations Board, 336 U.S. 245 (1949).
18. Algoma Plywood & Veneer Co. v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Board, 336 U.S.
301 (1949).
19. Int'l Ass'n. of Machinists v. Gonzales, 356 U.S. 617 (1958).
20. Youngdahl v. Rainfair, 355 U.S. 131 (1957), United Construction Workers v.
Laburnum Construction Corp., 347 U.S. 656 (1954). See also Ford v. Boeger, 362 F.2d 999
(8th Cir. 1966).
21. Allen-Bradley Local No. 1111, United Electrical, Radio & Machine Workers of
America v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Board, 315 U.S. 740 (1942).
22. 348 U.S. 468 (1955).
23. Garner v. Teamsters, Chauffeurs & Helpers Local Union No. 776 (A.F.L.), 346 U.S.
485 (1953). See also Bethlehem Steel Co. v. New York State Labor Relations Board, 330
U.S. 767 (1947), n which the Supreme Court overthrew a state agency certification of a
union consisting of foremen on the ground that state administrative action conflicted with
NLRB jurisdiction.
24. Amalgamated Association of Street, Electric Railway & Motor Coach Employees,
Division 998 V. Wisconsin Employment Relations Board, 340 U.S. 383 (1951).
25. Guss v. Utah Labor Relations Board, 353 U.S. 1 (1957), Amalgamated Meat Cutters
& Butcher Workmen of North America, Local No. 427, A.F.L. v. Fairlawn Meats, Inc.,
353 U.S. 20 (1957) San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon, 353 U.S. 26 (1957).
See also San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garnion, 359 U.S. 236 (1959) , Hotel Em-
ployees Union Local No. 255 v. Sax Enterprises, Inc., 358 U.S. 270 (1959).
26. 29 U.S.C.A. § 157 (1965), 49 Stat. 452 (1935) as amended 61 Stat. 140 (1947).
27. 29 U.S.C.A. § 158 (1965).
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The third case in the series, Garmon, should be noted in more
detail at this point, as it is the case cited most by advocates of
full federal preemption.
The Garmon brothers were engaged as partners, in the lumber
business in San Diego, California. None of their employees was a
member of any labor union, and they (the employees) had indicated
a desire to remain non-unionized. The San Diego Building Trades
Council decided that the Garmon's business should be unionized,
and demanded a labor agreement of the Garmons, which was to
include a union shop clause. The Garmons refused to sign such an
agreement, believing that prior to selection of a statutory bargain-
ing agent by their employees, the signing of such an agreement
would be an unfair labor practice. Shortly thereafter, the union
commenced picketing the company's premises. The purpose of said
picketing, as found by the trial court, was "to force the company
to execute the agreement or suffer destruction of its business. '
'28
The Garmons brought an action in state court seeking damages and
an injunction against the picketing.
The trial court gave judgment awarding damages, and granting
the injunction. The Supreme Court of California, with three Jus-
tices dissenting, affirmed this judgment. 29 The United States
Supreme Court held that the California state courts were incom-
petent to grant injunctive relief under either state or federal law,
and implied that a damages award could not be granted by a state
court under federal law 30 The Supreme Court then remanded to
the California court for a decision on whether damages could be
awarded under California law This last decision was arrived at
despite the fact that the NLRB had refused jurisdiction of an un-
fair labor practice charge brought by Garmon prior to his suit
in state court.
On remand the California Supreme Court decided that damages
could be awarded for the tortious concerted activity under state
law 31 When the case again came before the Supreme Court of the
United States in 1959, it held that state courts have been pre-
empted of jurisdiction over all activities arguably within Section 7
or Section 8 of the LMRA, regardless of a refusal to exercise juris-
diction by the NLRB. State and federal courts must both bow to the
NLRB's jurisdiction when an activity is arguably subject to Section
7 or Section 8, and this is so even though only damages for tortious
28. Garmon v. San Diego Building Trades Council, 45 Cal.2d 657, 291 P.2d 1, 3 (1955).
29. Supra note 28.
30. San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon, 353 U.S. 26 (1957).
31. Garmon v. San Diego Building Trades Council, 49 Cal.2d 595, 320 P.2d 473 (1958).
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concerted activity be sought in the state court.82
The Guss, Fairlawn Meats, and the two Garmon cases had ef-
fectively created a "no-man's land" m the area of labor relations.
State courts were forbidden to take jurisdiction over labor disputes,
even though the NLRB refused to exercise its jurisdiction. 3 But
as Justice Burton stated:
Congress has demonstrated a continuing and deep
interest in providing governmental machinery for handling
labor controversies. The creation by it of a large, unsuper-
vised, no-man's land flies in the face of that policy Due
regard for our federal systems suggests that all doubts on
the score should be resolved in favor of a conclusion that
would not leave the State powerless when the federal agency
declines to exercise its jurisdiction."
Congress reacted to this problem, and others, in the labor re-
lations field with the passage of the Landrum-Griffin Act3 5 in 1959.
This act added Section 14(c) to the Labor Management Relations
Act.36 This section caused much concern and debate just prior to
the time of its passage. In contrast to what it provided, some had
advocated forcing the NLRB to assume jurisdiction over all cases
within the full range of its power 37 Another proposal would have
spelled out m detail the area in which state courts could work and
the type of law to be applied in arriving at their decisions.3 8
The accepted amendment reads as follows:
(c) (1) The Board, in its discretion, may by rule of
decision or by published rules adopted pursuant to the Ad-
ministrative Procedure Act, decline to assert jurisdiction
over any labor dispute involving any class or category of
employers, where, in the opinion of the Board the effect of
such labor dispute on commerce is not sufficiently sub-
stantial to warrant the exercise of its jurisdiction; provided,
that the board shall not decline to assert jurisdiction over
any labor dispute over which it would assert jurisdiction
under the standards prevailing upon August 1, 1959.
(2) Nothing m this Act shall be deemed to prevent or
bar any agency or the courts of any State or Territory
(including the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, Guam, and
the Virgin Islands), from assuming and asserting juris-
32. San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236 (1959). See also
Figueroa v. National Maritime Union of America, AFL-CIO, 342 F.2d 400 (2d Cir. 1964).
33. Cases cited supra note 25.
34. Guss V. Utah Labor Relations Board, 353 U.S. 1, 18 (1957) (dissenting opinion).
35. Labor-jManagement Reporting and Disclosure Act, P.L. 86-257, 73 Stat. 519 (1959).
36. 29 U.S.C.A. § 164(c) (1965), Section 701(a) of the LMRDA (Landrum-Griffin Act).
37. 1 LzaIs. HIST. OF TEE LMRDA oF 1959 397 (1959), report on S. 1555, S. 3974, 85th
Cong., 2d Sess. § 602 (1958).
38. 105 Cong. Rec. 5947 (1959), the Prouty amendment.
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diction over labor disputes over which the Board declines,
pursuant to paragraph (1) of this subsection, to assert
jurisdiction. s9
Theoretically, this amendment should have ended the "no-man's
land" problem. It seems, however, that this section has probably
raised as many questions as it has answered. The following por-
tions of the paper will be devoted to a discussion of Section 14 (c)
and the rights, powers and duties of state courts and agencies in
asserting their "residual jurisdiction." 40
II. PREEMPTION - PRO AND CON
The problem of the power of the several states to solve labor-
management relations problems still looms as one of the more vex-
mg questions m the labor law field.
The National Labor Relations Board can, theoretically, cover
almost the total spectrum of labor disputes, as the range of the
commerce power extends to the most minute operations, because
of the possibility that multiplication of these minutiae could ser-
iously affect commerce. 41 The Board, however, has never, for var-
ious reasons,42 been able to exercise its full power After the Guss,"8
Fairlawn Meats," and Garmon4 5 decisions, if the NLRB would not
take jurisdiction to settle the labor dispute, with a few minor excep-
tions, 46 no authority could exercise such jurisdiction. Let us now
examine the rationale behind the theory of complete federal pre-
emption.
One of the foremost of the arguments advanced for federal pre-
emption is stated by Mr Justice Jackson in Garner v Teamsters,
Chauffeurs & Helpers Local Union No. 776 (AFL) 47
A multiplicity of tribunals and a diversity of procedures
39. Supra note 36.
40. Aaron, The Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, 73 HARv. L.
REV. 1086, 1094 (Part 11, 1960) "Considered in the context of the LMRDA, the new
formula for allocating jurisdiction over labor-management disputes between the federal
government and the states is something of a paradox. Ostensibly, it nullifies the decisions
of the Supreme Court in the Guss and Companion cases and restores a measure of power
to state courts and agencies. Its net effect, however, is to adopt the long line of Supreme
Court decisions confirming the federal government's preemption of the labor relations field
while throwing a few crumbs to the states, Congress made it clear that the lion's share of
labor cases is reserved exclusively for the NLRB and the federal courts." The phrase "re-
sidual jurisdiction" is used in Russell v. Electrical Workers Local 569, 48 Cal. Rptr. 702,
409 P.2d 926 (1966).
414 Cf. Polish National Alliance of the United States v. National Labor Relations
Board, 322 U.S. 643 (1944) Wickard v. Fllburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942) National Labor
Relations Board v. Fainblatt, 306 U.S. 601 (1939).
42. Supro note 8 and accompanying text.
43. 353 U.S. 1 (1957).
44. 353 U.S. 20 (1957).
45. 353 U.S. 26 (1957), 359 U.S. 236 (1959).
46. Supra notes 17-21 and accompanying text.
47. 346 U.S. 485 (1953).
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are quite as apt to produce incompatible or conflicting
adjudication as are different rules of substantive law The
same reasoning which prohibits federal courts from inter-
vening in such cases, except by way of review or on appli-
cation of the federal Board, precludes state courts from
doing so. 48
Thus, a statement of the requirement of uniformity of decision
is made, but why must labor decisions be uniform? The arguments
are primarily as follows:
1. Many industries and many labor organizations are now na-
tional m scope, and their operations, contracts, and labor disputes
take effect in a multi-state area. It is not conceivable to the
advocate of full federal preemption, that an industry-wide dispute
could be at the mercy of the courts or agencies of the several
states .49
2. If the states were allowed to apply their labor laws to var-
ious situations, industrial complexes would tend to migrate to states
in which the law tended to favor management, thus disrupting the
stream of commerce.50
3. The majority of the states do not have labor legislation that
compares to Sections 7 and 8 of the LMRA51 and thus labor problems
would have to be solved according to the common law of the several
states which as a rule is unfavorable to organized labor 52
4. The competency of local state courts to realize the scope of
the labor problem, and to be able to render intelligent, unbiased
decisions is also questioned by the preemptionists.5 1
It is clear that the preemptionists feel that uniformity of treat-
48. Id. at 490.
49. 105 Cong. Rec. 17875 (1959), remarks of Senator Morse. Roumell and Schlesinger,
THE PREEMPTION DILEMMA IN IA&BOR RELATIONS, 18 U. DET. L. J. 135, 158 (Part II, 1955).
50. Roumell and Schlesinger, supra note 49 at 159.
51. Only 14 states have a comprehensive labor relations code Colorado COLO. REv.
STAT., 1963 §§ 80-4-1 to 80-4-22 (1964) , Connecticut: CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 31-101 to 31-111
(1961) Hawaii HAWAII REv. LAWS §§ 90-2 to 90c-3 (Supp. 1963), as amended S.L. 1965,
Act 244 Kansas: KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 44-801 to 44-817 (1964) Massachusetts: MASS.
GEN. LAWS ANN. Ch. 150A §§ 1-12 (1958), Michigan. MICH. COMP. LAWS §§ 423.2 to 423.25
(Supp. 1961), Minnesota. MINN. STAT. §§ 179.01-179.58 (1966) New York. N.Y.
LAB. LAW §§ 700 to 717, Oregon. ORE. REv. STAT. §§ 662.010 to 662.655 (1965) North Da-
kota N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 34-12-01 to 34-12-14 (Supp. 1965), Pennsylvania. PA. SnAT.
ANN. tit 43, §§ 211.1 to 211.13 (1964) Rhode Island. R. I. GEN. LAWS ANN. §§ 28-7-1 to
28-7-47 (1957) Utah. UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 34-1-1 to 34-1-34 (1966), Wisconsin. Wis.
STAT. ANN. §§ 111.01 to 111.19 (1957).
52. 105 Cong. Rec. 17875 (1959), remarks by Senator 'Morse. "For labor disputes in-
volving employers and unions below the Board's standards, the conference bill would
allow State agencies and State courts to exercise jurisdiction. Of the 50 states, 38 have
no administrative agencies whatsoever, hence, in these states, labor disputes will be handl-
ed by state courts."
53. Roumell and Schlesinger, 8upra note 49 at 160 105 Cong. Rec. 17875 (1959), remarks
of Senator Morse.
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ment as applied by federal authority is the only answer to labor-
management problems.
Another reason for the extension of federal preemption prior to
1959 was the fact that the states had not shown a willingness to
take the matter in hand. 54
There are three basic theories in regard to the extent of pre-
emption of state jurisdiction.5 5 The first is that when Congress has
legislated in a certain field, the states are powerless to act in that
area.56 This theory is exemplified by a statement of Mr Justice
Holmes in the Varnville Furniture57 case:
When Congress has taken the particular subject-matter
in hand coincidence is as ineffective as opposition, and a state
law is not to be declared a help because it attempts to go
farther than Congress has seen fit to go.58
This theory is the one espoused by the preemptionists.
The second basic theory is that state law does not have to
yield to federal law unless it clearly conflicts therewith.59 This
test does not presently reflect the trend of federal judicial thought. 60
The third theory is that state action m the labor relations field
should not be excluded unless Congress has specifically voiced an
intention to do so.6 1 Professor Cox feels that Congressional specif-
icity in this area is impossible, and that it is up to the courts in the
first instance to maintain the balances of federalism. 62
Before proceeding to discussion of the actual exercise of state
jurisdiction under Section 14 (c) a glance at some of the arguments
m favor of state jurisdiction over labor relations problems is in order
State law is likely to be more immediately responsive
to prevailing public sentiment than is federal law
Moreover, to cut off this opportunity, would be to make an
unwarranted assumption as to the ultimate wisdom of federal
labor legislation and to deprive the nation of valuable prag-
matic lessons which can be learned if the possibilities for
55. See generally Comment, 59 MicH. L. REv. 643, 645 (1961), Roumell and Schlesing-
er, The Preemption Dilemma in Labor Relations, 18 U. DET. L. J. 17, 23 (Part I, 1954),
Smith, The Taft-Hartley Act and State Jurisdiction over Labor Relations, 46 MicH. L. RBv.
593. 614 (1948).
56. Supra note 55. But of. Michelman, State Power to Govern Concerted Employee
Activities, 74 HARV. L. REv. 641, 647 (1961).
57. Charleston & Western Carolina Ry. Co. v. Varnville Furniture Co., 237 U.S. 597
(1915).
58. Id. at 604, See also Garner v. Teamsters, Chauffeurs & Helpers Local Union No.
776 (A.F.L.), 346 U.S. 485, 500 (1953).
59. Supra note 55, Petro, Participation by the States in the Enforcement and Develop-
ment of National Labor Policy, N. Y. U. FIFTH ANNUAL CONF. ON LAB. 1, 31 (1952).
60. Cf. Amalgamated Meat Cutters & Butcher Workmen of North America, Local No.
427, A.F.L. v. Fairlawn Meats, Inc., 353 U.S. 20, 23 (1957), Notes 57 and 58 supra.
61. Supra note 55.
62. Cox, Federalism in the Law of Labor Relations, 67 HARe. L. RXV. 1297, 1846 (1954).
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social experimentation inately presented by our federal
system are fully exploited. 68
So, the first argument is that the authority with the primary
(in terms of geographical impact) interest m the dispute should have
a hand m resolving it.6" The second argument uses the Holmesian 65
theory that the state should be used as a testing ground for a
multiplicity of ideas in order to point the way to more effective
legislation, both national and local.
Another argument is that state agencies (and possibly state
courts) would act faster in settling a labor dispute than does the
NLRB.66  As long as the state action reached a result consistent
with, or at least not violently disruptive of, federal labor policy,
there seems to be no reason not to favor speed in adjudication. e
It has also been argued that Congress had no intention in the
Wagner and Taft-Hartley Acts of completely regulating all phases
of labor relations, and thereby completely excluding the states.6"
The NLRA and the LMRA were intended to protect public rights
and put an end to unfair labor practices, and, with minor excep-
tions,6 9 were not designed to vindicate private rights.7 0 Preemption
of a state court's jurisdiction over actions for damages for violation
of a private right cannot rely on the same rationale as do decisions
denying state courts the right to enjoin labor activities.7 1 The re-
versal of an award of damages leaves the parties m status quo,
while an injunction would cause the strike, or other dispute, to dis-
sipate itself, without a solution of the underlying issues.7 2  The
argument that the allowance of a state damage action would stifle
labor experimentation is refuted by the experience with civil suits
allowed under Section 3037s of the Labor-Management Relations
63. Smith, The Taft-Hartley Act and State Jurssdiction over Labor Relations, 46 MICH.
L. REv. 593, 595 (1948).
64. Michelman, supra note 56 Petro, supra note 59 at 37.
65. Holmes, J. dissenting in Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U.S. 312, 344 (1921) "There is
nothing that I more deprecate than the use of the Fourteenth Amendment beyond the ab-
solute compulsion of its words to prevent the making of social experiments that an im-
portant part of the community desires, in the insulated chambers afforded by the several
States, even though the experiments may seem futile or even noxious to me and to those
whose judgement I most respect." See also Roumell and Schesinger, The Preemption Dilem-
ma in Labor Relations, 18 U. DET. L. J. 135, 160 (Part II, 1955).
66. Petro, supra note 59 at 37, Roumell and Schesinger, aupra note 65.
67. Petro, aupra note 59 at 31.
68. Id. at 17.
69. Section 10(c), 29 U.S.C.A. § 160(c) (1965), allows the NLRB, in certain instances,
to award back pay to reinstated employees.
70. Comment, 36 U. DET. L. J. 92 (1958), Michelman, State Power to Govern Con-
certed Employee Activities, 74 HARV. L. REV. 641, 653 (1961).
71. O. San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon, 353 U.S. 26 (1957), Garner v.
Teamsters, Chauffeurs and Helpers Local Union No. 776 (A.F.L., 346 U.S. 485 (1953).
72. Comment, 58 MICH. L. REv. 288, 292 (1959).
73. 29 U.S.C.A. § 187 (1965). 61 Stat. 158 (1947) as amended 73 Stat. 545 (1959).
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Act.7 4 Therefore the states should be allowed to uphold their laws
which protect private rights,75 and if an error is made, the right
of final review should be with the United States Supreme Court.76
Linn v United Plant Guard Workers of America, Local 114,'7
points out that the preemption question is still very much alive.
The case involved a libel action filed in federal district court, on the
basis of diversity of citizenship, against a union which had pub-
lished statements concerning plaintiff's employer (Pinkerton National
Detective Agency, Inc.) and himself which allegedly were libelous.
The district court dismissed the action78 on the ground that the
umon's action was arguably an unfair labor practice under Section
8 (b) 7 9 of the LMRA, and thus jurisdiction was preempted by the
NLRB. The district court cited Garmon80 in arriving at this deci-
sion. The court of appeals affirmed the judgment. 81
On certiorari, the Supreme Court reversed the judgment stating
that the state's concern with the perpetration of libel overcame the
"merely peripheral concern" of the NLRB in this type of union
activity 82
Mr Justice Clark, in writing for a five justice majority, 83 made
observations that could lead to a new look at complete preemption
of state authority.
When the Board and state law frown upon the publication
of malicious libel, albeit for different reasons, it may be
expected that the injured party will request both adminis-
trative and judicial relief. The Board would not be ignored
since its sanction alone can adjust the equilibrium disturbed
by an unfair labor practice. If the malicious libel contributed
to union victory in a closely fought election, few employers
would be satisfied with simply damages for 'personal' injury
caused by the defamation. An unsuccessful union would also
seek to set the election results aside as the fruits of an
74. Michelman, State Power to Govern Concerted Employee Activities, 74 HARv. I. RIv.
641, 653-54 (1961).
75. See Rose, The Labor Management Relations Act and the State's Power to Grant
Relief, 39 VA. L. REV. 765, 769 (1953).
76. Petro, Participation by the States in the Enforcement and Development of National
Labor Policy, N. Y. U. FIFrH ANNUAL CoNF. ON LAB. 1, 50 (1952) "There Is a single
Judicial head of this nation. If what state courts do in human situations which might also
involve NLRA unfair practices is inconsistent with the national policy, rightly construed,
the United States Supreme Court has the function and the duty of setting matters
straight."
77. 383 U.S. 53 (1966).
78. Information at 337 F.2d 69, the district court's opinion is unpublished, see 383 U.S.
57.
79. 29 U.S.C.A. § 158(b) (1965).
80. San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236 (1959).
81. Linn v. United Plant Guard Workers of America, Local 114, 337 F.2d 68 (6th Cir.
1964).
82. Supra note 77 at 61, 63.
83. It is to be noted that Justice Clark dissented in the Fairlawn Meats, 353 U.S. 20
(1957), Garmon, 353 U.S. (1957), and Gu a, 353 U.S. 1 (1957) cases, see 353 U.S. 12.
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employer's malicious libel. And a union may be expected
to request similar relief for defamatory statements which
contribute to the victory of a competing union. Nor would
the courts and the Board act at cross purposes since, as
we have seen, their policies would not be inconsistent."4
(Emphasis supplied)
Thus, it seems a possibility that the federal courts will recog-
nize that there is another method of allocating power between state
and federal governments in regard to labor problems; a method
based on a study of the results achieved by state action super-
imposed upon the results desired by federal law
Therefore, in deciding questions of preemption, courts
should attribute to the statute the objective of achieving a
rational allocation of functions in a federal system. The
decisional process should take into account the degree to
which the proposed state action would impair the national
program, as it is understood from the words and the evident
policies of the NLRA. Against this impact should be weighed
the magnitude of the interest which the state seeks to protect
and the appropriateness, in light of the national interest, of
the mode of protection selected by the state. 85
The point has now been reached for a discussion of the problems
involved in the exercise of state jurisdiction in the area of authority
allotted to the states by Section 14 (c) (2) 18
III. MAJOR PROBLEMS UNDER 14(c)
The problems involved m making a working proposition out of
Section 14 (c) (2) are diverse, but seem to center on two main
areas: First, what is within the NLRB's jurisdiction, and who is to
announce whether a dispute is within or Without; and, second, once
a state agency or court assumes jurisdiction what law is to be
applied?
Section 14 (c) (1) provides that the NLRB is not to refuse to
assert jurisdiction over cases which it would have taken under its
standards extant on August 1, 1959.87 These standards 8  leave huge
areas of the labor-management stratum unregulated. 9 Further,
these standards are complex, and difficult of application.9"
84. Supra note 77 at 66. See also Prospect Dairy, Inc. v. Dellwood Dairy Co., 237 F
Su-pp. 176, 177 (N.D.N.Y. 1964).
85. Michelman, supra note 74 at 681.
87. See 1 CCH LAB. L. R5$. 1610, p. 5407 (1966).
86. 29 U.S.C.A. § 164(c) (2) (1965).
88. Ibid.
89. McCoid, Notes on a "G-String" A Study of the "No Man's Land" of Labor Law,
44 MINN. L. REv. 205, 233 (1959).
90. Aaron, The Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, 73 HARv. L.
Rxv. 1086, 1095 (1960) 105 Cong. Rec. 17877, remarks of Senator Morse, Hanley, Federal-
NOTES
Although the board cannot refuse to exercise jurisdiction over
cases within the above standards, it can, at its discretion, exer-
cise jurisdiction over cases not falling within those standards.9 1 A
prime example of this expansion is the recent assertion of juris-
diction over gambling casinos92 which were excluded under the 1959
standards.93
Another problem is that the NLRB may decline jurisdiction only
to have a federal court determine that such refusal was arbitrary
and without the baord's ambit of power 94
The above factors are pointed out to illustrate the danger, to
disputants, that a state court or agency, having made a seemingly
valid assumption of jurisdiction, will have its judgments endangered
when the NLRB decides to expand its jurisdiction.9 5
The crux of the jurisdictional problem is which authority should
make the initial determination as to the NLRB's exercise of juris-
diction.
Although a state court may assume jurisdiction over
labor disputes over which the National Labor Relations
Board has, but declines to assert, jurisdiction, 29 U. S. C.
§§164 (c) (1) and (2) (1958 Ed.Supp V), there must be a proper
determination of whether the case is actually one of those
which the Board will decline to hear 96
This somewhat cryptic quote is the last word the Supreme Court
has had to say on the subject. Who is to make the "proper deter-
mination?" The Association of State Labor Relations Agencies ad-
vocates state action before the NLRB declines jurisdiction in the
specific case.97
A recent California case 8 has interpreted Broadcast Service99
to mean that state courts are competent to determine whether the
case falls within their "residual jurisdiction" m the first instance.
Justice Tobrmer, for a unanimous court, stated:
State Jurlsdiction In Labor's No Man's Land: 1960, 48 GEo. L. J. 709, 713 (1960). For ex-
ample of the confusion in application, see McAllister Transfer Inc., 110 N.L.R.B. 1769
(1954).
91. Of. McLeod v. Local 32-E, Building Service Employees International Union, AFL-
CIO, 227 F Supp. 242, 245 (S.D.N.Y. 1964).
92. El Dorado Inc., 151 N.L.R.B. 579 (1965).
93. Supra note 87.
94. Cf. Hotel Employees Local No. 255, Hotel and Restaurant Employees and Bartend-
ers International Union v. Leedom. 358 U.S. 99 (1958), Office Employees International
Union, Local No. 11, AFL-CIO v. National Labor Relations Board, 355 U.S. i13 (1957)
National Relations Board v. Harrah's Club, 362 F.2d 425 (9th Cir. 1966).
95. Lorenz, Problems of Federal-State Jurisdiction in Labor Relations, N.Y.U. Fip'rH
ANNuAL CONp. oN LAB. 119, 124 (1952).
96. Radio & Television Broadcast Technicians Local Union 1264, IBEW, AFL-CIO v.
Broadcast Service of Mobile, Inc. 380 U.S. 255, 256 (1965).
97. Aaron, supra note 90 at 1095-96.
98. Russell v. Electrical Workers Local 569, 48 Cal. Rptr. 702, 409 P.2d 926 (1966).
99. Supra note 96.
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We hold that the jurisdiction exercised by the state
courts pursuant to Section 14 (c) does not depend upon a
showing that the board has, in fact, declined to act. Rather,
we believe that the party seeking relief need only demon-
strate, on the basis of published regulations and decisions
of the board, that the case is one which the board would
decline to hear 100
The court stated that to rule otherwise would frustrate Congress'
clear intention that the board should be able "to delimit the bound-
ares of its jurisdiction" through decision or duly published regula-
tions, and not be forced to decline jurisdiction on a case-by-case
basis.10 1
Although the NLRB is prepared to give informal jurisdictional
advice through its regional offices,102 this process would be time-
consuming and would involve making the same determinations re-
garding the standards as the state court or agency would have to
make in order to take jurisdiction. 10 If the NLRB were to advise that
it would decline jurisdiction, the time consumed at arriving at this




There is a certain class and size of business which can be
recognized by the humblest of courts as being solely within NLRB
jurisdiction, beyond this line the local courts could be corrected by
the Supreme Court, 05 if necessary This would tend to speed the
settlement of labor disputes in smaller economic units, and could
possibly encourage more states to pass labor legislation modeled
after federal law, which, in turn, could possibly encourage the NLRB
to cede jurisdiction to some of the states'" thus reducing its case
load,0 8 and allowing it to concentrate more energy on truly national
labor problems.
100. Russell v. Electrical Workers Local 569, 48 Cal. Rptr. 702, 409 P.2d 926 (1966).
Contra, Gust G. Larson & Sons, Inc., v. Radio & Television Broadcast Engineers Local No.
1220, IBEW, 66 Il. App.2d 146, 213 N.E.2d 100, 107 (1965) "It is essential, however, that
a person seeking relief through a State court, in such a situation, show by appropriate
allegations in the complaint for Injunction that he has, in fact, sought the aid of the
Board and that the Board has not, or cannot, act in time to prevent substantial and ir-
reparable injury."
101. Supra note 98 at 704 of 48 Cal. Rptr.
102. 29 C.F.R. Hi 101.39 to 101-41 (1966).
103. supra note 98 at 704 of 48 Cal. Rptr. But cf. Beeson, Boundaries of State-Federal
JurLdiction in Labor-Management Relations Under the New Labor Law - A Federal
View, N.Y.U. THIRTEENTH ANNUAL CONF. ON LAB. 61, 64 (1960).
104. Supra note 101.
105. 105 Cong. Rec. 17878 (1969). remarks of Senator Morse Hanley, Federal-State
Jursdiction in Labor's No Man's Land 1960, 48 GEo. L. 3. 709, 713 (1960) "It has been
said that even the Board experts cannot determine the boundaries of Board jurisdiction."
106. Petro, supra note 76.
107. The NLRB may cede jurisdiction to the states under Section 10(a), 29 U.S.C.A.
§ 160(a) (1965), of the NLRA. This, however, has never been done. See letter from J.M.
Glaser, North Dakota Deputy Commissioner of Agriculture and Labor to John Graham,
dated December 29, 1966.
108. The NLRB had 7007 cases pending as of June 30, 1960, TwENT-FnTH ANNUAL
EPORT NLRB 177 (1961), and 8911 cases pending as of June 30, 1965, THIRTIETH ANNUAL
NOTES
Another area of concern raised by Section 14 (c) (2) 109 is which
law-state or federal-is to be applied once a state agency or court
assumes jurisdiction of a labor dispute?
There are three general theories concerning this, as yet, un-
answered question:
The first is the "accordion" theory1 0 which, in its strictest form,
would not allow the state courts or agencies to apply state law at
all. This theory is based on two concepts: First, because the scope
of the NLRA-LMRA has not been restricted by the addition of Sec-
tion 14(c), the state courts and agencies have no choice but to act
as "little NLRB's" and to protect federally created rights as the
NLRB and the federal courts would do on the same facts; 11 and
second, because the jurisdiction of the NLRB is subject to expan-
sion and retraction (the accordion effect),112 it has never totally
lost jurisdiction but is only declining to exercise it, and therefore
the state courts and agencies must apply federal substantive law
when they step into the NLRB's shoes. 18
The second theory is the "willy-nilly" theory"24 which states that
in exercising their "residual jurisdiction" state courts and agencies
must apply state law This theory would probably not be upheld
by the federal courts, as espousal of this theory would allow the
NLRB not only to forego jurisdiction in favor of the states, but
would also allow the NLRB to endanger the protection of federal
substantive rights by passing to the states the power to render
decisions that conflict with those rights. 115
The third theory, and seemingly the only workable one, is that
state courts and agencies can apply both state and federal law, as
they choose, but they cannot apply state law where it would af-
firmatively conflict with federally protected rights."16
The use of the latter theory will not jeopardize the body of
federal labor law already created, but it will allow the state auth-
orities to continue that experimentation which, hopefully, will create
a still more tightly rational law of labor in the future.
REPoRT NLRB 177 (1966). The NLRB decided 22,183 and 27,199 cases respectively in
those same fiscal years.
109. 29 U.S.C.A. § 164(c)(2) (1965).
110. Aaron, eupra note 90 at 1097-98.
111. Papps, Section 701 and the State courts, what Law to be Applied? 48 GEO. L. J.
316, 322 (1959).
112. Aaron, supra note 90 at 1097-98. Cf. Mceod v. Local 32-E, Building Service Ern-
ployees International Union, AFL-CIO, 227 F Supp. 242, 245 (S.D.N.Y. 1964).
113. Papps, supra note 111.
114. Aaron, supra note 90 at 1097-98.
115. Hanley, Federal-State Jurisdiction in Labor's No Man's Land. 1960, 48 GEo. L. J.
709, 731 (1960).
116. Aaron, supra note 90 at 1097-98 Cohen, Congress Clears the Labor No Man's Land
A Long-Awaited solution spawns a Host of New Problems, 56 Nw. U.L. , Ev. 333 (1961).
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IV CONCLUSION
The field of labor law remains confused,'117 and will probably
continue to remain so far into the future. The fact that the states
are once again able to create labor law may well add to that
confusion. However, it is equally possible that joint federal-state
experimentation and cooperation may lead instead to a speedier
solution of many of the problems involved in labor-management re-
lations.""
The state authorities can play their part in this federalistic
partnership by overcoming some of their ancient bias against labor,
where it exists, and by rendering decisions which reflect adequate
consideration of the totality of the interests involved in the labor
relations field.":9
Further, more of the states could pass legislation which would
create agencies designed specifically to deal with labor relations
problems.
Congress could attempt to clarify, with further legislation, the
problems created by Section 14(c) so as to guide the courts and
agencies in their actions.
The federal courts could well heed the words of Justice Bren-
nan in rendering decisions wherein preemption is involved:
The principle to be derived from our decisions is that
federal regulation of a field of commerce should not be
deemed preemptive of state regulatory power in the absence
of persuasive reasons-either that the nature of the regulat-
ed subject matter permits no other conclusion, or that the
Congress has unmistakably so ordained.
1 20
JOHN A. GRAHAM
117. Petro, supra note 76 at 20.
118. Petro, supra note 76 at 69 Crum, The North Dakota Labor Management Relation8
Act, 37 N.D.L. Rsv. 321, 322 (1961). Professor Crum states that the North Dakota Act was
a response to changes in the law at the federal level.
119. RoumeIl and Schlesinger, supra note 65 at 161.
120. Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142 (1963).
